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INTRODUCTION
The intellectual environment at Columbia University when I was a graduate student in 1940*1942 was far different from that in which the modern graduate student in economics finds himself. Neoclassical price theory now holds pride of place, as all student will acknowledge, some joyfully, some ruefully. But at Columbia at that period there was no required course in price theory. Indeed there was no course at all offered which gave a systematic exposition of microeconomics, except for Harold Hotelling's one term offering of mathematical economics, the content of which would today be more or less standard for a general course but which was then regarded as highly esoteric indeed. The one required course which was most nearly equivalent to price theory was a course on the history of economic thought, where the lecturer gave potted summaries of everyone from the mereintalists on. Walras was barely mentioned and certainly was much less prominent than H. J. Davenport. Keynes was not mentioned (for that matter the General Theory was not mentioned even in the course on business cycles, though there were some glancing references to the Treatise on Money).
But the work of Thorstein Veblen was indeed prominently displayed in the course on economic thought, and it was no accident. The corrosive skepticism of Veblen towards "received" theory had.
This is the text of the John R. commons Lecture for 1973, delivered under the sponsorship of Omicron Delta Epsilon at the Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association of 1973). But even apart from the influence on formal training, Thorstein Veblen*s ideas pervaded the intellectual culture. For many, no doubt, Veblen's own special style contributed to the dissemination of his ideas. The style and the content were inseparable. The most prominent characteristic was irony. Nor for him, on the one hand, the studious avoidance of loaded statements and the planned, plodding sentences of economists aspiring to be scientists; but on the other hand, not for him the polemical style and the overt anger at the injustice of the world to be found in Marx and more especially in the later Marxists.
The world is indeed full of injustices, and the writings of economists full of attempts to disguise them; but these propositions are causes for laughter and scorn, not for agitation. Nothing is more .MadtaaaMi mmi^^^^^^m" 'SSgw ^»■ i "'* mm mmGmm**«mmimmmmpimmmmmm™*!m*i -3 -characteristic than his free use of words with high value loading, the implications of which are always immediately di claimed and unconvincingly apologized for. Perhaps the flavor of his prose can be best brought out by means of a long quotation, his reflections on the future of economics at the 1925 meeting of the American Economic
Association.
"Therefore any distinctive or peculiar traits to be looked for in the science, in the way of scope and method, in the range of its inquiry and the drift and bias of its guiding interest, its logic and its data, will be due to arise out of those characteristic habits of thought that are induced in the incoming generation of economists in the course of that habituation to which they will have been exposed during the period of their growth and adolescence and during those marginal periods of waning flexibility that make up the initial phase of adult life ... In some substantial, perhaps critical and decisive, respects, therefore, these incoming economists will have the advantage over the passing generation that habitually inures to late-comers. Loosely, the events current during the next quarter-century are due to be made up and handled by them in the terms and with the preconceptions that have been carried over out of the past quarter-century; instead of those more archaic holdovers of knowledge and belief out of the nineteenth century with which the passing generation of economists have gone to their work. ... Under these circumstances, it is to be presumed that a sort of effectual discrepancy is i again to be looked for between the working catagories and ; formulas employed by economists, on the one side, and the current exigencies of economic life, on the ctlier side; a discrepancy which should be appreciably more pronounced in this calculable future of the science than at any period in the past, and answering to the more appreciable interval of lag to be looked for, due to the swifter run of events."
As in any writer from the past, certain concerns and concepts that i now seem somewhat unusual are in fact reflections of the era rather i Simon and Richard Cyert: the requirements for optimization impose This process however, in Veblen's view, is unstable. If the lenders begin to infer that there has been over-capitalization, loans are called or not renewed. This effect is cumulative since the calling in of some loans makes others more doubtful than they were before.
The Theory of Business Enterprise, p. 173.
Since the real assets underlying the debt structure are inadequate, the effect on the business structure as a whole is that familiar in a run on a bank.
It is perhaps worthy of remark that Veblen's picture might be valid even if all loans were accompanied by a corresponding investment in real terms; all that would be required is that the maturity structure of mouey loans be shorter than that of the underlying real investments.
To continue with Veblen : s argument, his picture of a "crisis" is rather different than our post-Keynesian view of a recession. There is no emphasis on movements in real terms. On the contrary, "the shrinkage incident to a crisis is chiefly a pecuniary, not a maturity In what was probably a relatively new observation, Veblen put great emphasis on the possiblity of depression, that is a prolonged ^^■PW^BWWWBWWWwmw LLM wmiBmmm*mmmmmmmmmmmmmmm*mi* ~ ■--«,^.*,.,-.
-12 -period of relatively dull business, a time of unempbyment of both plant and men persisting over a period of time. This might be taken to be an anticipation of Keynes's underemployment equilibrium, though the description scarcely falls into an equilibrium mold. The fundamental cause, according to Veblen, is that older firms tend to become over-capitalized relative to newer ones. Veblen gives two reasons for the superior competitive power of new firms. One is that they may be created in periods of lower interest rates and hence require lower rates of return to justify themselves. A second explanation is that the course of technological progress in newer firms will always be able to drive down the rates of return on old assets. As a result, there always tends to be a large sector of industry with lower than anticipated rates of return; if financed out of borrowed capital, this means lower than normal rates of return on owned capital. Veblen never assumes, as many modern models do, that technological progress will be anticipated by the investor; and he seems to assume that only new firms will be able to take advantage of new technology.
The argument is that the depressed state of the rate of return on capital on the average acts to discourage investment. The logic to this is certainly unclear, since the marginal investor is presumably not affected. But Veblen's argument is pyschological:
"Depression is primarily a malady of the affections of the business- In Veblen's model, there is no forecasting of technological change. The earlier entrant confidently believes that there will be no better way to invest his resources later on. But, interestingly enough, it can easily be true that even if the early entrant correctly forecasts fucure growth and productivity, it might still elect to invest early. For, let £ be the rate of interest by which all future returns are discounted. Then a country which is aware that there will be technological progress will be faced with a choice of investing now or waiting till year T.
If it did the first, the present value of its future income will be a/r; if it waits the present value discounted to year T will be a'/r, but then the value -rT discounted back to the year 0 will be e (a'/r), which might very well be < a/r. Hence an early entrant might well rationally choose to invest now even knowing that there will be technological change, and yet it will be true that when observed later, it will have a smaller national income.
Obviously this mechanism can explain why later arrivals may rank higher in GNP computations than early ones, but it does not prove that in the history of the country as a whole backwardness was an advantage.
The exaiuple I gave, which involved a discontinuous jump in productivity, might be judged a bit artificial. But the phenor.enon 
